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Abstract
Both Colombian and English law impose pre-contractual information duties on the assured; 
in both cases these duties are derived from the principle of good faith present in Roman law, 
the law merchant and throughout early modern insurance law. However, the development 
of this principle and the consequent duties in each jurisdiction led to sufficiently significant 
differences that produced substantial criticism and reform in England, but have not led 
to much criticism in Colombia. Even though the Colombian approach is not always more 
favourable to the assured, the specific situations in which Colombian law is more assured 
friendly have been enough to not disturb the different actors of the insurance business. 
The solutions introduced in 2012 in England have in a great way equated, at least in the 
field of consumer insurance law, the assured’s pre-contractual duty of information with the 
Colombian regime. In the end both jurisdictions have been able to cope with the difficulties 
that good faith in the pre-contractual stage can entail. Most problems have been or are being 
addressed and good faith and the assured’s pre-contractual information duties remain a 
very significant and important part of both countries insurance contract law.
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Resumen
Tanto la ley colombiana como la inglesa imponen al asegurado deberes precontractuales 
de información; en ambos casos estas obligaciones se derivan del principio de buena fe 
presente en el derecho romano, en la lex mercatoria y en las primeras leyes de seguros 
modernos. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de este principio y los deberes resultantes en cada 
jurisdicción llevaron a diferencias suficientemente significativas que produjeron importantes 
críticas y reformas en Inglaterra, pero no han dado lugar a muchas críticas en Colombia. 
A pesar de que el enfoque colombiano no siempre es más favorable para el asegurado, 
las situaciones específicas en las que la ley colombiana sí es más amigable al asegurado 
han sido suficientes para no molestar a los diferentes actores de la actividad aseguradora. 
Las soluciones introducidas en 2012 en Inglaterra han en gran medida equiparado, por lo 
menos en el campo del derecho de seguros de consumidores, los deberes precontractuales 
de información con el régimen colombiano. Al final ambas jurisdicciones han sido capaces 
de hacer frente a las dificultades que la buena fe en la etapa precontractual puede acarrear. 
La mayoría de los problemas han sido o están siendo abordados y la buena fe y los deberes 
de información precontractual del asegurado siguen siendo una parte muy importante y 
significativa del derecho de seguros de ambos países.
Palabras clave: Seguros, contrato de seguro, buena fe, declaración del estado del riesgo, 
reticencia, inexactitud.
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Introduction
Both in Colombia1	and	in	England2 it is frequently stated that insurance is a contract based 
upon	the	utmost	good	faith.	The	common	explanation	is	that	due	to	its	particular	nature,	
insurance	 requires	 in	 the	 pre-contractual	 stage	 an	 extraordinary	 duty	 of	 disclosure	 on	
behalf	 of	 the	 assured,	 who	 is	 presumed	 to	 know	 the	 state	 of	 the	 risk,	 in	 order	 for	 the	
insurer,	who	is	presumed	to	know	nothing	about	it3,	to	make	an	informed	decision	regarding	
if	 he	will	 assume	 the	 risk	or	not	and,	 if	 so,	 on	what	 terms4. Furthermore, it is said that 
any	other	solution	to	the	 lack	of	 information	of	the	 insurer	on	the	state	of	the	risk,	such	
as,	 for	example,	 requiring	 the	 insurer	 to	 inspect	 the	risk,	would	be	ruinous	 to	 the	day	 to	
day	underwriting	of	insurance	and	would	make	insurance	too	expensive,	or,	at	least,	more	
expensive	and	less	commercially	attractive5.	However,	during	the	past	decades,	good	faith	
and	the	duty	of	disclosure	have	suffered	severe	criticism	in	England6. Discontent reached 
such	a	point	 that	when	 the	Law	Commission	was	appointed	 to	 review	English	 insurance	
law,	 the	first	 topic	 it	 tackled	after	 the	emission	of	 their	first	scoping	paper	 in	2006	was	
that of the pre-contractual information issues, ie non-disclosure and misrepresentation. 
The	call	 for	 reform	 led	 to	 the	Consumer	 Insurance	 (Disclosure	and	Representations)	Act	
2012, which substantially changed the law in respect to the duties and consequences 
of pre-contractual good faith in consumer insurance contracts, and to a revision of the 
law	regarding	business	insurance	which	is	still	being	undertaken	by	the	Law	Commission7.
1	 Corte	Constitucional,	 Judgement	C-232	of	15	May	1997,	per	Jorge	Arango	Mejía;	 J.	Efrén	Ossa,	Teoría General del 
Seguro, El Contrato	(2nd	edn,	Temis	1991)	44.
2	 S	17	of	the	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906;	Carter	v	Boehm	(1766)	3	Burr	1905;	Pan	Atlantic	Insurance	Co	Ltd	v	Pine	Top	
Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1995]	1	A.C.	501.
3	 Greenhill	v	Federal	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1927]	1	KB	65,	76-77;	Rozanes	v	Bowen	(1928)	32	L1LRep	98,	102.	Nonetheless,	
this classical assertion of insurance law has recently been questioned due to all the technological advancements which 
seem to leave the insurer in a better position than that which he use to traditionally occupy. See Peter Macdonald 
Eggers	and	others,	Good Faith and Insurance Contracts	(3rd	ed	Lloyd’s	List	2010)	xiv.
4	 Re	Yager	(1912)	108	LT	28;	Ossa	Op.Cit.,	pp.	44-45,	325;	Andrés	E	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros N.o 3: 
Las Obligaciones y Cargas de las Partes en el Contrato de Seguro y la Inoperancia del Contrato de Seguro (Universidad 
Externado	de	Colombia	2004)	20;	Howard	Bennett,	The Law of Marine Insurance	 (2nd	edn,	OUP	2006)	para	4.07;	
Eggers	and	others	Op. Cit.,	para	3.80.
5	 Ossa	(n	1)	325;	Carlos	I	Jaramillo,	Derecho de Seguros,	vol	2	(Temis	2011)	651.
6	 Reuben	 A	Hasson,	 ‘The	Doctrine	 of	 Uberrimae	 Fides	 in	 Insurance	 Law:	 a	 critical	 evaluation’	 (1969)	 32	MLR	615;	
The	 Law	 Commission	 and	 The	 Scottish	 Law	 Commission,	Consultation Paper No. 182 – Insurance Contract Law: 
Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the Insured – A Joint Consultation Paper (2007) 
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp182_ICL_Misrep_Non-disclosure_Breach_of_Warranty.pdf>	 accessed	
23	August	2013;	Eggers	and	others,	Op. cit., vii.
7	 The	 Law	 Commission	 and	 The	 Scottish	 Law	 Commission,	 Consultation	 Paper	 No	 204	 –	 Insurance	 Contract	 Law:	
The	Business	 Insured’s	Duty	of	Disclosure	and	the	Law	of	Warranties	–	A	Joint	Consultation	Paper	 (2012)	<http://
lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp204_ICL_business-disclosure.pdf>	accessed	23	August	2013.
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Conversely,	during	the	same	period	of	time	in	Colombia,	even	though	at	first	glance	the	pre-
contractual duties the insured bore due to the principle of good faith seemed quite similar to 
those	that	existed	in	England,	no	criticism	was	being	raised	on	the	matter	by	either	academics	
or the courts. It is not as if the insurance industry was not being criticised at all: actually, it 
had been slated to such a point that Congress passed several acts in recent years regarding 
insurance	(many	of	which	were	enacted	in	order	to	increase	consumer	protection);	it	is	just	
that none of those changes aimed at modifying the rules on pre-contractual disclosure and 
representations by the assured8.
As	it	will	be	shown	in	this	paper,	the	reasons	present	in	English	law	that	led	to	the	call	for	
reform seem not to have been present in Colombian law, even though good faith is deeply 
embedded	not	only	in	Colombian	insurance	law	but	in	its	contract	law	in	general.	The	scope	
of the assured’s duties of pre-contractual disclosure and representation, labelled in Colombia 
as	the	duty	to	faithfully	declare	the	state	of	the	risk,	are	not	as	harsh	on	the	insured	as	its	
English	counterparts:	the	range	of	facts	and	circumstances	that	have	to	be	disclosed	is	not	as	
wide,	and	the	remedies	available	to	the	insurer	vary	depending	on	the	(lack	of)	diligence	with	
which	 the	assured	 incurred	 in	non-disclosure	or	misrepresentations.	 Additionally,	 contrary	
to	what	has	happened	 in	England,	 the	Colombian	Supreme	Court	of	 Justice	has	used	 the	
exceptions	to	the	duty	to	faithfully	declare	the	state	of	the	risk	to	increase	the	level	of	diligence	
with which the insurer must act during the pre-contractual stage.
This	comparative	analysis	of	the	development	and	current	state	of	good	faith	in	Colombian	
and	English	insurance	law	will	evidence	how	two	similar	principles,	that	even	share	a	common	
historical	foundation,	may	evolve	in	such	different	ways	that	while	in	one	jurisdiction	reform	
was	seen	as	long	overdue,	in	the	other	jurisdiction	reform	has	not	even	crossed	the	mind	of	
either insurers, assureds or academics.
It may be needless to say that good faith in insurance contracts entails more than pre-
contractual disclosure and representation duties on behalf of the assured. Good faith, as 
established by the Colombian Supreme Court, is present in an insurance contract since 
before	 its	 inception	 and	 until	 after	 its	 expiration9.	 This	 is	 evidenced	 by	 other	 duties	 and	
rules derived from good faith such as the insurer’s duty of disclosure and information10, the 
8	 Law	1328	of	2009	introduced,	among	other	things,	new	rules	on	insurance	consumer	protection;	it	focused	not	on	
modifying the pre-contractual information duties of the assureds, but on increasing the information duties of insurance 
companies, as well as creating a more effective consumer attention system, including a further reaching ombudsman 
service and prohibiting the use of abusive practices and clauses.
9	 Corte	Suprema	de	Justicia,	Judgement	of	2	August	2002	per	Carlos	Ignacio	Jaramillo.
10	 Howard	N	Bennett,	‘Mapping	the	Doctrine	of	Utmost	Good	Faith	in	Insurance	Law’	(1999)	LMCLQ	165,	180;	Andrés	E	
Ordóñez,	‘Los	Deberes	Recíprocos	de	Información	en	el	Contrato	de	Seguro:	Y	Especialmente	el	Deber	de	Información	
del	Asegurador	Frente	al	Tomador	del	Seguro’,	en:	Revista de Derecho Privado,	Bogotá,	núm.	9,	2005	;	Eggers	and	
others, Op. cit., Ch 12.
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assured’s duty to present a fair claim11 and the insurer’s duty to tend to claims diligently.12 
Nevertheless,	this	paper	will	only	deal	with	these	other	duties	incidentally,	for	it	will	focus	on	
the	assured’s	duty	to	faithfully	declare	the	state	of	the	risk.
The	order	in	which	this	matter	will	be	approached	is	the	following:	some	introductory	remarks	
will	be	made	on	the	Roman	origins	of	good	faith,	 its	 incursion	 into	the	 law	merchant	and	
ultimately	 European	medieval	 and	 early	modern	 insurance	 law.	 Secondly,	 we	will	 assess	
the	circumstances	that	led	to	reform	in	English	Law,	starting	from	the	introduction	of	good	
faith	 by	 Lord	Mansfield,	 its	 codification	 in	 the	Marine	 Insurance	 Act	 1906	 and	 finalising	
with	 the	 reform	 introduced	by	 the	Consumer	 Insurance	 (Disclosure	and	Representations)	
Act	2012.	Further	on,	Colombia’s	law	and	doctrine	on	good	faith	in	insurance	contracts	will	
be	presented	in	light	of	its	differences	with	English	law	on	that	matter,	in	order	to	be	able	to	
conclude	why	reform	was	imminent	in	one	jurisdiction	and	not	within	the	other.
Common origin
Good	 faith	 finds	 its	 origin	 in	Roman	 law	where	 it	was	 introduced	 in	order	 to	 counter	 the	
rigidness	of	their	‘old’	civil	law13. It did not consist of a clear distinct rule but of a principle 
that	encouraged	the	judge	to	find	a	more	equitable	solution	to	the	cases	at	hand	even	if	such	
solutions	found	no	support	in	the	existing	law14.
Based on the solutions inspired by the principle of good faith, new rules and institutions 
started to emerge such as the aedilitian remedies for cases of latent defects15 or rescission 
for	mistake	and	duress16. Good faith went as far as establishing that the seller had the duty 
to	inform	the	buyer	of	all	the	circumstances	known	by	him	relating	to	the	subject-matter	of	
the contract when the buyer had no other mean of informing himself17.
11	 Bennett,	 ‘Mapping	the	Doctrine	of	Utmost	Good	Faith’	 Ibíd.,	207-218;	Andrés	E	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de 
Seguros, Op. cit.,	pp	104-107,	151-152;	Eggers	and	others,	Op. cit., Ch 11.
12	 Eggers	and	others,	Op. cit., Ch 12.
13	 Johan	Hendrik	 Botes, From Good Faith to Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance	 (Peter	 Lang	 2006)	 18;	 Simon	
Whittaker	 and	Reinhard	 Zimmermann,	 ‘Good	 Faith	 in	 European	Contract	 Law:	 Surveying	 the	 Legal	 Landscape’	 in	
Simon	Whittaker	 and	 Reinhard	 Zimmermann	 (eds.),	Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) 16.
14	 Martin	Josef	Schermaier,	‘Bona	Fides	in	Roman	Contract	Law’	in	Simon	Whittaker	and	Reinhard	Zimmermann	(eds.),	
Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cambridge University Press 2000) 63-6.
15 The	aedelitian remedies were created “where losses were suffered as a result of latent defects” and consisted in 
redhibition (i.e avoidance) and reduction of the price. See Botes, Ibíd., p. 23.
16 S.	Whittaker,	Op. cit., 17.
17	 J.	Botes,	Op. cit., 20.
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These	new	rules	were	not	rigid	but	subject	to	good	faith	themselves18.	Cicero	explains	how	
even	if	good	faith	entailed	“that	the	buyer	should	be	told	of	all	the	defects	which	are	known	
to	the	seller	[…	and	that]	If	the	latter	conceals	known	defects,	then	he	should	be	liable	for	
any detriment resulting to the innocent buyer”19, this would not be the case if the buyer had 
known	of	the	defect20.
During	the	middle	ages	the	principle	of	good	faith	was	identified	with	that	of	equity21. From 
both	 concepts	medieval	 jurists	 derived	 a	 series	 of	 rules	 similar	 to	 those	 that	 had	 been	
inspired	by	the	principle	of	good	faith	in	Roman	law.	These	rules	included,	for	example,	that	
parties	should	keep	their	word;	that	they	should	not	take	advantages	of	one	another	either	
by	misleading	the	other,	nor	by	driving	harsh	bargains;	and	that	they	were	obliged	not	only	
to what had been established in the contract, but also to what an honest person would 
recognize	the	contract	implied	even	if	it	was	not	expressly	established22.
Good faith and equity applied to all contracts in the middle ages and were especially of great 
importance in the law merchant23.
It	was	during	this	time,	in	the	late	XIV	century,	that	insurance	as	we	now	know	it	started	to	
appear	in	the	Italian	city	states	and	to	spread	all	over	Europe,	first	through	Mediterranean	
trade	and	then	through	the	merchant	cities	around	the	North	Sea24.	As	all	other	merchant	
affairs, insurance was regulated through the law merchant and the codes issued in one state 
to	compile	these	rules	and	principles	would	rapidly	spread	to	the	other	European	cities25. 
Among	these	rules	were	those,	as	in	any	other	contract,	derived	from	good	faith.	Even	though	
there	was	no	explicit	reference	to	good	faith	in	early	insurance	regulation,	requirements	that	
the	contract	be	judged	in	accordance	to	good	faith	and	the	custom	of	merchants	are	found	
even in the earliest marine insurance policies26.
“As	in	all	other	contracts,	good	faith,	first	of	all,	dictated	that	there	should	be	no	fraud	or	
deceit	 in	contracts	of	 insurance.	 In	the	context	of	marine	insurance,	the	function	of	good	
18 M. Schermaier, Op. cit.,	pp.	69-70.
19 Ibíd.,	pp.	67-8.
20  Ibíd., pp. 69-70.
21	 S.	Whittaker,	Op. cit., p. 17.
22	 James	 Gordley,	 ‘Good	 Faith	 in	 Contract	 Law	 in	 the	 Medieval	 Ius	 Commune’	 in	 Simon	 Whittaker	 and	 Reinhard	
Zimmermann	(eds),	Good Faith in European Contract Law	(Cambridge	University	Press	2000)	94.
23 S.	Whittake,	Op, cit., p.17.
24 Harold	E.	Raynes,	A History of British Insurance	(2nd	edn,	Sir	Isaac	Pitman	&	Sons	LTD	1964)	Ch	I	and	II.
25 Ibíd.
26	 J.	Botes,	Op. cit., p. 70.
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faith to deter fraud meant that both insurer and assured should not misrepresent any facts 
relating	to	the	substance	of	the	contract,	i.e.	the	risk	attaching	to	the	subject-matter	to	be	
insured. Further to this, good faith required the parties not conceal any such fact relating 
to	the	risk.	But	this	rule	against	concealment	was	also	related	to	another	function	of	good	
faith, namely to assure that insurer and assured concluded the policy on equal information 
footing…	The	implication	of	such	a	requirement	would	be	that	neither	the	assured,	nor	the	
insurer	should	be	allowed	to	take	advantage	of	an	informational	advantage	over	the	other”27.
As	it	can	be	observed,	good	faith	meant	more	than	just	the	assured’s	duty	of	disclosure,	and	
the consequences for the inobservance of good faith varied according to the circumstances. 
Pothier,	for	example,	indicated	that	“[t]he	good	faith	that	should	reign	in	this	contract,	as	in	
all	others,	binds	each	of	the	parties	to	dissimulate	nothing	from	the	other	of	what	he	knows	
in	connection	with	the	subject-matter	of	the	contract”28.	When	this	duty	was	breached	by	the	
insurer,	he	would	have	to	return	the	premium,	even	if	he	also	had	to	pay	the	indemnity;	when	
it was breached by the assured, Pothier sustained that the consequence must be nullity and 
that	it	would	be	insufficient	just	to	offer	“the	price	of	the	risk”29.
Development of good faith in English insurance law
1.	 Lord	Mansfield’s	original	conception
In	England,	insurance	was	introduced	by	the	Mediterranean	and	North	Sea	merchants	and	
therefore it followed their rules and customs30. For several centuries the disputes that arose 
between them were not settled by the common law courts but by merchant tribunals. From 
the	XIV	century	onwards	several	courts,	such	as	the	Court	of	Admiralty,	the	Privy	Council	and	
the Court of Commissioners, would come in competition with these merchant tribunals until 
the	VXIII	century	when	jurisdiction	would	be	assumed	by	the	common	law	courts31.
However	 it	 was	 not	 until	 Lord	Mansfield	 was	 appointed	 Lord	 Chief	 Justice	 of	 the	 King’s	
Bench in 1756 that the law merchant started to be properly introduced into the common 
law.	 In	 fact,	 it	 was	 his	 objective	 to	 harmonise	 the	 law	merchant	 and	 the	 common	 law32. 
Lord	Mansfield	was	an	expert	in	the	civil	law	and	the	law	merchant,	he	was	familiar	with	the	
continental writers and had studied the most important marine and insurance codes from 
27 Ibíd., 63-4 (footnotes omitted).
28 Ibíd.,	p.	48	citing	Pothier,	Traité du Contrat d’Assurance, Tome Cinquième d’Oeuvres de Pothier	(Cosse	et	N.	Delamotte	
Videcoq	Père	et	Fils	1847)	Chap	III	Sect	III	n	191.
29 Ibíd., pp. 64-5.
30	 H.	Raynes,	Op. cit.,	p.	34;	J.	Botes	Op. cit.,	p.	39.
31	 H.	Bennett,	‘Mapping	the	Doctrine	of	Utmost	Good	Faith’,	Op. cit.,	pp.	186-188.
32	 Eggers	and	others,	Op. cit., para 1.11.
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other	European	nations	and	city	states	and	was	therefore	able	to	introduce	the	principles	of	
insurance	that	had	applied	all	over	Europe	into	the	common	law	of	England33.
Among	 the	 principles	 he	 introduced,	 established	 in	 the	 paradigmatic	 case	 of	 Carter	 v	
Boehm34,	was	that	of	good	faith.	As	it	was	recognised	in	the	continent,	Lord	Mansfield	did	
not	 believe	 that	 it	 was	 a	 principle	 that	 applied	 exclusively	 to	 insurance	 contracts	 but	 to	
all contracts in general35.	Good	faith,	as	it	had	been	intended	since	Roman	law,	promoted	
fairness in contracts and discouraged fraud36.
The	terms	in	which	the	principle	of	good	faith	was	introduced	by	Lord	Mansfield	were	very	
similar	to	those	used	by	the	medieval	and	early	modern	continental	jurists.	He	did	not	impose	
a harsh burden on one of the parties alone, instead he rightfully distributed different duties 
among them in order to give them an equal opportunity to access information37: it is true that 
the	assured	had	a	duty	to	disclose	those	facts	which	were	known	to	him,	but	the	insurer	also	
had the responsibility to obtain information he considered material and this responsibility 
reduced the assured’s duty of disclosure38. 
2. The tergiversation of good faith
However	 the	 judges	 that	 followed	 Lord	 Mansfield	 made	 several	 modifications	 or	 took	
different approaches39.	On	the	one	hand	the	principle	of	good	faith	was	confined	to	a	select	
group of contracts, among them those of insurance40, by this meaning, mainly, that in all 
other contracts the principle of caveat emptor applies41. Further on, at least in the case of 
insurance	contracts,	and	according	to	Reuben	A.	Hasson42, the duties that where derived 
from	good	faith	seem,	on	the	one	hand,	to	have	grown	a	lot	stricter	then	how	Lord	Mansfield	
33 J.	Botes,	Op.cit.,	p.	39.
34 (1766)	3	Burr	1905.
35 Ibíd.,	1164:	“The	governing	principle	is	applicable	to	all	contracts	and	dealings.”
36 Ibíd.,	1169.
37 Even	 though	Carter	v	Boehm	 is	normally	 traced	as	 the	source	of	 the	assured’s	duty	of	disclosure	 in	English	 law,	 it	
is	normally	omitted	that	it	was	the	assured	who	came	out	victorious	in	the	dispute,	for	even	though	Lord	Mansfield	
considered the assured bore a duty of disclosure, he also considered the insurer could have informed himself through 
other means of the facts that were not disclosed.
38 Ibíd.,	1164	 ff.	See	also	 the	abstracts	of	Mayne	v	Walter	 (1787)	 in	R.	Hasson,	 ‘The	Doctrine	of	Uberrimae	Fides	 in	
Insurance Law’, Op. cit., p. 17.
39 R.	Hasson,	‘The	Doctrine	of	Uberrimae	Fides	in	Insurance	Law’,	Op. cit.,	p.	618	ff.
40 J.	Botes,	Op.cit.,	p.	95.	Nevertheless,	“the	principles	of	misrepresentation	have	remained	universally	applicable	to	all	
contracts	in	English	law.”	Eggers	and	others,	Op. cit., para 1.02, 3.01.
41 Bell	v	Lever	Bros	Ltd	[1932]	AC	161,	224,	227;	Eggers	and	others, Op. cit.,	para	1.07-1.08.
42 R.	Hasson,	 ‘The	Doctrine	of	Uberrimae	Fides	 in	 Insurance	Law’,	Op. cit.	See	also	J.	Botes,	Op. cit.,	 John	Lowry	and	
others, Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles	(3rd	edn,	Hart	Publishing	2011)	86.
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had proposed and, on the other hand, to have focused on the duties and burdens that the 
principle imposed on the assured.
One	example,	among	others43,	is	Bates	v	Hewitt44 in which the insurer was allowed to avoid 
the contract for non-disclosure because, even though he had been aware of the undisclosed 
fact some time before the insurance had been placed and had means to identify such facts, 
the	judge	considered	that	this	did	not	discharge	the	assured	from	his	duty	to	disclose	the	
fact.	It	seems	as	if,	contrary	to	what	Cicero	had	indicated,	the	judges	had	stopped	qualifying	
the rules derived from good faith by good faith itself and had made them strict rules that did 
not always promote fairness between the parties45.	As	it	will	be	shown	later,	the	approach	
taken	in	Bates	v	Hewitt	evidences	the	different	attitude	with	which	English	and	Colombian	
courts have addressed issues such as impossibility to rescind the contract when the insurer 
knew	or	should	have	known	the	undisclosed	circumstance.
3. Good faith, non-disclosure and misrepresentation in the Marine 
Insurance Act
The	common	law	on	the	matter	would	then	be	codified	into	sections	17-20	of	the	Marine	
Insurance	Act	(MIA)	of	1906,	which,	as	has	been	largely	accepted,	apply	equally	to	marine	
and non-marine insurance46.	The	general	principle	of	good	faith	is	recognized	in	section	17	
of	the	MIA	as	follows:
“A	contract	of	marine	insurance	is	a	contract	based	upon	the	utmost	good	faith,	
and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be 
avoided by the other party” .
As	it	had	been	developed	in	continental	law,	section	17	establishes	that	the	principle	of	good	
faith must be observed by both parties, ie it does not place burdens only on the assured 
but	on	the	insurer	as	well.	However,	contrary	to	Roman	law	and	the	approach	taken	in	other	
jurisdictions,	the	MIA	reduces	the	remedy	for	the	inobservance	of	good	faith	to	avoidance,	
which has been considered inappropriate or too harsh by the courts in cases that revolve 
around	the	insurer’s	duty	of	information,	the	assured’s	duty	to	make	claims	in	good	faith	and	
even in cases of minor breaches to the assured’s duty of disclosure47.	Avoidance	as	the	unique	
remedy	for	breach	of	good	faith	has	been	one	of	the	major	sources	of	criticisms	of	English	
43	 See,	eg	Lindenau	v	Desborough	 (1828)	8	B&C	586;	Joel	v	Law	Union	and	Crown	 Insurance	 [1908]	2	KB	863	(CA).
44	 (1867)	LR	2	QB	595.
45	 R.	Hasson,	‘The	Doctrine	of	Uberrimae	Fides	in	Insurance	Law’, Op. cit. 
46	 Joel,	Op. cit;	Lambert	v	Co-operative	Insurance	Soc	Ltd	[1975]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep	845;	Pan	Atlantic	Insurance	[1995]	518.
47	 Pan	Atlantic	Insurance	Co	Ltd	v	Pine	Top	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1993]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	496,	506;	Kauser	v	Eagle	Star	Insurance	
Co	Ltd	[2000]	Lloyd’s	Rep	IR	154,	157;	Peter	MacDonald	Eggers,	‘Remedies	for	the	Failure	to	Observe	the	Utmost	Good	
Faith’	(2003)	LMCLQ	249;	J.	Botes,	Lowry	and	others,	Op. cit.,	p.	91.
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law	on	the	matter	and	consists	of	one	of	the	major	differences	between	the	Colombian	and	
English	approach	not	only	regarding	the	assured’s	pre-contractual	information	duties,	as	will	
be analysed in detail, but other duties derived from good faith48.
Even	though	good	faith	has	to	be	observed	by	both	parties,	the	sections	that	follow	section	
17	only	established	duties	for	the	assured.	Sections	18-20	contain	the	assured’s	(and	his	
agent’s)	specific	pre-contractual	duties	of	disclosure	and	faithful	representation.
Section	18(1)	establishes	that	“the	assured	must	disclose	to	the	insurer,	before	the	contract	
is	concluded,	every	material	circumstance	which	is	known	to	the	assured”.	“If	the	assured	
fails	to	make	such	disclosure,	the	insurer	may	avoid	the	contract”.	Regarding	what	is	known	
to	the	assured,	the	same	section	establishes	that	the	“assured	is	deemed	to	know	every	
circumstance	which,	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business,	ought	to	be	known	by	him”.
A	material	circumstance,	as	defined	in	section	18(2),	 is	every	circumstance	“which	would	
influence	the	judgment	of	a	prudent	insurer	in	fixing	the	premium,	or	determining	whether	
he	will	take	the	risk”.	It	has	been	interpreted	by	the	courts	to	include	any	circumstance	that	
a reasonable insurer would considerer relevant in determining whether he will assume the 
risk,	 and	 if	 so,	 under	which	 conditions,	 but	without	 this	meaning	 that	 the	 circumstance,	
if	 disclosed,	 would	 have	 necessarily	 led	 the	 insurer	 to	 deny	 the	 risk	 or	 to	 accept	 it	 on	
different terms or for a different premium49. Such an understanding of materiality has been 
criticized for being too wide50;	the	debate	has	been	centred	not	only	on	the	understanding	
of	materiality	introduced	in	Pan	Atlantic	but	also	on	the	fairness	or	unfairness	of	a	prudent	
underwriter	test	(in	opposition	to	a	reasonable	assured	test).	As	it	will	be	evidenced	below,	
the	approach	taken	by	Colombian	law	does	not	choose	between	a	prudent	underwriter	or	
prudent insurance test and guarantees that the assured will not have to disclose information 
that	the	insurance	company	did	not	let	him	know	was	relevant	or	facts	or	circumstances	that	
common sense would not have revealed as such and therefore conforms itself better to the 
intent of promoting fairness present in the principle of good faith.
Although	it	was	not	included	in	the	MIA,	in	order	for	the	insurer	to	be	allowed	to	avoid	the	
contract, the non-disclosed circumstance besides being material, must have induced the 
actual insurer into the contract51.	The	requirement	of	inducement	was	taken	from	the	general	
law	of	misrepresentation	and	it	was	extended	to	non-disclosure52.
48 For	example,	article	1078	of	the	Colombian	Commercial	Code	establishes	that	if	an	assured	presents	a	claim	in	bad	
faith he will loss the right to the indemnity (instead of the contract being void.
49 Pan	Atlantic	[1995],	Op. cit.
50 Norma	J	Hird,	‘Pan	Atlantic:	Yet	More	to	Disclose’	(1995)	JBL	608.
51	 Pan	Atlantic	[1995],	Op cit.
52 Ibíd.
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Section	18(3)	establishes	some	circumstances	that,	in	absence	of	enquiry,	do	not	have	to	
be	disclosed.	Those	circumstances	are	 those	which	diminish	 the	 risk;	 “any	circumstance	
which	is	known	or	presumed	to	be	known	to	the	insurer	(and	the	insurer	is	presumed	to	know	
matters	of	common	notoriety	or	knowledge,	and	matters	which	an	 insurer	 in	the	ordinary	
course	of	his	business,	as	such,	ought	to	know);	any	circumstance	as	to	which	information	is	
waived	by	the	insurer;	and	any	circumstance	which	it	is	superfluous	to	disclose	by	reason	of	
any	express	or	implied	warranty”	.
In	 addition	 to	 the	 duty	 of	 disclosure,	 section	 20	 of	 the	 MIA	 sets	 that	 “Every	 material	
representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer during the negotiations for 
the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be true” and “If it be untrue the 
insurer	may	avoid	the	contract.”	Materiality	is	defined	in	the	same	terms	it	was	defined	for	
non-disclosure and has also been interpreted in an identical way53. Besides being material, 
the misrepresentation must have induced the insurer into the contract in order for him to be 
allowed to avoid it54.
As	 if	 the	requirement	of	materiality	was	not	strict	enough,	besides	what	 is	established	 in	
sections	18	and	20,	based	on	section	17	the	courts	have	broaden	the	assured’s	duty	by	
concluding that materiality is irrelevant with regards to the information requested by the 
insurer55 and in the cases in which the non-disclosure or misrepresentation is fraudulent56. 
Materiality	also	loses	all	significance	when	the	form	is	made	basis	of	the	contract57.
4. Criticism and pressure for reform: The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure 
and Representations) Act 2012
During recent decades criticism has sprung against good faith in the pre-contractual stage. 
Recommendations	 for	 reform	were	made	since	1957	by	 the	Law	Reform	Committee	and	
again	 in	1980	by	 the	English	Law	Commission,	 in	 this	 last	occasion	 it	being	pointed	out	
that reform had been too long delayed58. In 2006 the Law Commission issued a scoping 
paper in order to determine which areas of insurance contract law were in need of reform, 
nevertheless non-disclosure and misrepresentation had already been chosen as one of 
53 Ibíd.
54 Ibíd.
55	 Container	Transport	International	Inc	v	Oceanus	Mutual	Underwriting	Association	(Bermuda)	Ltd	[1984]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	
476, 512.
56	 Pan	 Atlantic	 [1995],	Op. cit.,	 p.	 533;	 Bennett,	 ‘Mapping	 the	Doctrine	 of	 Utmost	Good	 Faith’,	Op cit., pp.	 177-178.
57	 Reuben	Hasson,	 ‘The	Basis	of	 the	Contract	Clause	 in	 Insurance	Law’	 (1971)	34	MLR	29;	H.	Bennett,	The Law of 
Marine Insurance, Op. cit., para 4.205-4.206.
58	 R.	Hasson,	The	Law	Commission	and	The	Scottish	Law	Commission,	Consultation Paper No. 182, Op. cit., para 
1.16-1.17.
Journal of International Law
86 A compArAtive AnAlysis of utmost good fAith in colombiAn And english insurAnce lAw
Daniel Vásquez-Vega
Vol. 5, 02 | July - December 2014, Colombia
the	at	least	two	topics	that	were	going	to	be	examined	by	the	Law	Commission	(the	other	
being breach of warranty)59.	The	law	was	viewed	as	unjust	because	it	was	“heavily	biased	
against the interests of consumers”60. Call for reform became imminent and eventually 
led	 to	 the	Consumer	 Insurance	 (Disclosure	and	Representations)	Act	2012	which	deeply	
modified	the	state	of	 the	 law	regarding	pre-contractual	good	faith	 in	consumer	 insurance	
contracts.	Nevertheless,	debate	around	reform	is	not	finished.	The	Law	Commission	is	still	
analysing other sectors of insurance law in order to determine if and how they should be 
modified.	Concerning	good	faith,	the	pre-contractual	duties	in	commercial	insurance	are	still	
a	matter	to	be	defined,	as	are	the	rules	pertaining	to	fraudulent	claims	in	both	consumer	
and commercial insurance61.	The	debate	on	reform	of	good	faith	has	been	centred	on	those	
who consider that what has to be reformed is not the duties themselves but the remedies 
and those who consider that even the duties deserve a change62.	At	least	in	what	relates	
to	the	pre-contractual	duties	in	consumer	contracts,	it	was	the	second	group	who	‘won’	the	
debate	being	that	the	Consumer	Insurance	Act	2012	not	only	modifies	the	remedies	but	also	
eliminates	the	duty	of	disclosure	and	modifies	the	duty	to	not	misrepresent.
In	 our	 opinion,	 the	 reform	 introduced	 by	 the	 Consumer	 Insurance	 Act	 2012	 effectively	
responded to the criticism by levelling the playing ground between insurers and consumers. 
The	 Act	 distinguished	 consumer	 insurance	 contracts	 as	 those	 contracts	 of	 insurance	
between “an individual who enters into the contract wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated 
to the individual’s trade, business or profession”, and an insurer.63	 Section	 2	 of	 the	 Act	
established	 that	 “It	 is	 the	 duty	 of	 the	 consumer	 to	 take	 reasonable	 care	 not	 to	make	 a	
misrepresentation to the insurer” and that this duty “replaces any duty relating to disclosure 
or	representations	by	a	consumer	to	an	insurer	which	existed	in	the	same	circumstances	
before”	the	Act	applied;	accordingly	“any	rule	of	law	to	the	effect	that	a	consumer	insurance	
contract	is	one	of	the	utmost	good	faith	is	modified	to	the	extent	required	by	the	provisions	
of”	the	Act.	This	means	that,	at	least	for	consumer	insurance,	the	assured	no	longer	has	a	
duty	of	disclosure	and	this	eliminates	the	unfairness	that	existed	in	expecting	the	insured	to	
be	able	to	know	what	a	prudent	underwriter	considers	relevant	without	being	guided	by	the	
insurer.	As	it	will	be	submitted,	this	solution	is	similar,	in	some	respects,	to	those	established	
in	Colombia	since	the	1971	Commercial	Code	entered	into	force.
59	 The	Law	Commission	and	The	Scottish	Law	Commission,	 Insurance Contract Law: a Joint Scoping Paper (2006) 
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/ICL_Scoping_Paper.pdf>	 accessed	 23	 August	 2013,	 Para	 1.2,	
Appendix	A.
60 R.	Hasson,	The	Law	Commission	and	The Scottish Law Commission, Consultation Paper No. 182, Op. cit., para 1.40.
61 Ibíd., No. 204.
62	 See	 the	 discussion	 in	 Peter	 Macdonald	 Eggers,	 ‘The	 Past	 and	 Future	 of	 English	 Insurance	 Law:	 Good	 Faith	 and	
Warranties’	(2012)	1(2)	UCLJLJ	211,	234-236.
63	 Consumer	Insurance	(Disclosure	and	Representations)	Act	2012,	section	1.
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If	the	consumer	breaches	his	duty	“to	take	reasonable	care	not	to	make	a	misrepresentation	
to the insurer”, the insurer will have a remedy against the consumer if “the insurer shows 
that without the misrepresentation, that insurer would not have entered into the contract 
(or agreed to the variation) at all, or would have done so only on different terms”64.	This,	
again similar to Colombian law, eliminates materiality from the scene and focuses on the 
requirement of inducement.
Section	 5	 of	 the	 Act	 distinguishes	 between	 deliberate	 or	 reckless	 and	 careless	
misrepresentations.	A	misrepresentation	is	deliberate	or	reckless	if	the	consumer	“knew	that	
it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not it was untrue or misleading, and 
knew	that	the	matter	to	which	the	misrepresentation	related	was	relevant	to	the	insurer,	or	
did not care whether or not it was relevant to the insurer”65.	A	misrepresentation	is	careless	
“if	it	is	not	deliberate	or	reckless”66.
As	important	as	the	elimination	of	the	duty	of	disclosure	are	the	set	of	remedies	introduced	
by	the	Act:	if	the	“misrepresentation	was	deliberate	or	reckless,	the	insurer	may	avoid	the	
contract	and	refuse	all	claims,	and	need	not	return	any	of	the	premiums	paid,	except	to	the	
extent	(if	any)	that	it	would	be	unfair	to	the	consumer	to	retain	them.”67 If the misrepresentation 
was careless the remedies vary according to what the insurer would have done had there 
been no misrepresentation: “If the insurer would not have entered into the consumer 
insurance contract on any terms, the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, 
but must return the premiums paid”68. “If the insurer would have entered into the consumer 
insurance	contract,	 but	on	different	 terms	 (excluding	 terms	 relating	 to	 the	premium),	 the	
contract is to be treated as if it had been entered into on those different terms if the insurer 
so requires.”69 “In addition, if the insurer would have entered into the consumer insurance 
contract (whether the terms relating to matters other than the premium would have been 
the same or different), but would have charged a higher premium, the insurer may reduce 
proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim”70.	These	remedies	address	the	criticism	
that	had	centred	on	the	unfair	consequences	that	the	existence	of	a	sole	remedy	had	led	to,	
while still offering special protection to the particular nature of the contract of insurance. In 
this aspect, even though Colombian law offers several remedies, the Consumer Insurance 
Act	goes	beyond	what	was	envisaged	by	the	1971	Commercial	Code.
64  Ibíd., section 4.
65  Ibid., section 5.
66  Ibíd.
67  Ibíd., Schedule 1, section 2.
68  Ibid., Schedule 1, section 5.
69  Ibíd., Schedule 1, section 6.
70  Ibíd., Schedule 1, section 7.
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Finally,	 the	Act	also	establishes	that	 the	representations	made	by	 the	consumer	are	“not	
capable of being converted into a warranty by means of any provision of the consumer 
insurance contract (or of the terms of the variation), or of any other contract (and whether 
by declaring the representation to form the basis of the contract or otherwise)”71 therefore 
guaranteeing	 that	 the	 requirement	 established	 in	 section	 4	 of	 the	 Act	 will	 not	 be	made	
irrelevant nor the new remedies available reduced to avoidance.
As	 seen,	 the	 Consumer	 Insurance	 Act	 tackled	 the	 most	 relevant	 issues	 that	 were	
debated	during	the	past	decades	in	English	Law	regarding	pre-contractual	disclosure	and	
representations by the assured.
Development of good faith in Colombian insurance law
Having	revised	the	development	and	current	state	of	the	assured’s	pre-contractual	information	
duties	in	English	law	and	exposed	the	criticism	and	reform	it	has	been	subjected	to,	we	shall	
now	study	Colombian	insurance	law	on	the	matter	in	light	of	the	English	solutions.	First,	in	
order to set the scene, a general introduction will be made into Colombian law on good faith 
and	insurance;	afterwards,	the	duty	to	make	a	fair	presentation	of	the	risk	will	be	studied	
in	detail	in	order	to	conclude	why	the	criticism	raised	in	England	has	not	risen	in	Colombia.
1. Good faith in Colombian contract law
It is widely recognized among comparative lawyers that the principle of good faith has 
historically belonged to civilian legal systems and still, today, underpins most of their 
institutions in all branches of law72.	 The	 Colombian	 legal	 system,	 entirely	 from	 a	 civilian	
tradition,	is	not	the	exception.	Colombia’s	Civil	Code,	enacted	in	1887,	was	drafted	by	Don	
Andrés	 Bello	 mainly	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 Roman,	 French	 and	 Spanish	 law73.	 Although	 this	
code does not regulate contracts of insurance, it contains both the principle of good faith 
in contract law as well as many of the institutions that have derived from it. Indeed, article 
1603	establishes	that	contracts	have	to	be	executed	in	good	faith,	hence	the	parties	are	
obliged	 not	 only	 to	what	 is	 expressly	 agreed,	 but	 to	 everything	 else	 that	 emanates	 from	
their	 nature;	 additionally	 article	 1914	 ff	 establishes	 remedies	 for	 latent	 defects	 (vicios 
redhibitorios);	and	article	1508	ff	establishes	remedies	in	case	of	mistake,	duress	or	fraud	
(vicios del consentimiento)74.
71 Ibíd., section 6(2).
72	 S.	Whittaker, Op. cit.
73	 Martha	Lucía	Neme	Villareal,	‘El	Principio	de	Buena	Fe	en	Materia	Contractual	en	el	Sistema	Jurídico	Colombiano’,	en:	
Revista de Derecho Privado,	Bogotá,	núm.11,	p.	79.
74	 These	two	institutions	are,	in	their	general	features,	just	as	the	aedelitian remedies	and	rules	for	mistake	and	duress	
created	in	Roman	law	as	consequence	of	the	principle	of	good	faith.
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Furthermore	 the	 ‘new’	Colombian	Commercial	Code75	 sets	 in	article	863	 that	 the	parties	
to	 any	 contract	must	 act	 in	 good	 faith	 in	 the	 pre-contractual	 stage	 and	 article	 871	 sets	
that contracts should be entered into and implemented in good faith and, therefore, they 
oblige	 not	 only	 to	 what	 is	 expressly	 agreed	 in	 them,	 but	 to	 everything	 that	 according	 to	
the	law,	custom	and	equity	belong	to	their	nature.	Even	the	Constitution	through	article	83	
establishes that both private individuals and public authorities must adhere to the principles 
of good faith. Beyond these articles, good faith can be evidenced in Colombia’s unfair 
competition regulation, consumer protection regulation, corporate law, etc.76.
As	can	be	observed	in	article	871	of	the	Commercial	Code	and	in	accordance	to	what	has	
been	expressed	by	the	Supreme	Court,77 good faith must be present at every moment, ie 
during the period of contract formation, while the contract is in force and even after it has 
come to an end78.
2. Insurance in Colombian law
Insurance	is	not	regulated	by	the	Civil	Code	but	by	the	Commercial	Code.	The	first	Colombian	
Commercial	Code	was	enacted	in	1887.79	Unlike	section	17	of	the	MIA,	the	rules	pertaining	
to	 insurance	made	no	explicit	 reference	 to	 good	 faith,	meaning	 that	 the	general	 rules	of	
the	 Civil	 Code	 applied.	 Nevertheless	 article	 680	 established	 that	 the	 assured	 had	 the	
obligation	 to	 “declare	 sincerely	 all	 the	 necessary	 circumstances	 to	 identify	 the	 subject	
matter	assured	and	to	appreciate	the	extension	of	the	risks”	and	sanctioned	with	rescission	
all	misrepresentations	 or	 non-disclosure	 of	 “circumstances	 that,	 if	 known	by	 the	 insurer,	
could	lead	him	to	not	enter	into	the	contract	or	to	produce	a	modification	in	its	conditions”.
In	1971	the	‘new’	Commercial	Code	was	enacted.	Except	for	the	chapter	on	specific	marine	
insurance	rules,	which	was	 largely	based	on	the	English	Marine	 Insurance	Act	of	190680, 
the rest of the provisions were based on insurance regulation from other civil law countries 
such	as	that	from	France,	Mexico,	Italy	and	Argentina81.	Unlike	the	state	of	English	law	after	
the	 changes	 introduced	 by	 the	 Consumer	 Insurance	 Act	 2012,	 Colombian	 law	 does	 not	
distinguish between business and consumer assureds, consequently all the rules in the 
Commercial Code apply to both of them indistinctly.
75	 A	previous	Commercial	code	had	been	in	place	since	1887.
76	 M.	Neme,	Op. cit.
77	 Judgement	of	2nd	August	2001,	per	Carlos	Ignacio	Jaramillo.
78	 M.	Neme,	Op. cit.,	p.	85.
79	 The	old	Commercial	Code	was	based	on	the	Panamanian	Code	of	1869	which	was	in	turn	based	on	the	Chilean	Code	
of	1865.	See	C.	Jaramillo,	Op. cit., p. 10.
80	 ‘Explanatory	Preamble	to	the	1958	Code	of	Commerce	Project’	in	J.	Ossa,	Op. cit.,	Appendix	III	(free	translation).	The	
1958	Code	of	Commerce	Project	was	the	basis	for	the	debate	of	the	1971	Commercial	Code.
81	 C.	Jaramillo,	Op. cit., p. 657.
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Surprisingly, even though there is no rule that establishes that insurance contracts are ruled by any 
special principle of good faith other than the one that applies to any other contract, both the Supreme 
Court82 and the Constitutional Court83, when dealing with insurance cases that arise because of the 
breach of duties that are derived from good faith, have understood that the good faith present in 
insurance contracts is one of utmost nature (ubérrima buena fe) 84.
Good	faith	can	be	observed	in	multiple	 institutions	and	rules	of	Colombian	insurance	law.	Not	only	 is	
there a pre-contractual duty of information borne by the assured (as will be analysed in depth in the 
following	chapter),	but	the	assured	also	has	to	inform	the	aggravation	of	the	risk	while	the	contract	is	in	
place,85	he	has	to	inform	the	coexistence	of	other	contracts	of	insurance86, the claims he presents must 
not be fraudulent87, etc.
Besides the application of the general principle of good faith that applies to all contracts, and the fact 
that	civil	rules,	such	as	those	that	govern	case	of	mistake,	duress	or	fraud,	would	in	principle	apply	to	
contracts	of	insurance,	a	special	regime	was	established	in	the	Commercial	Code:	the	duty	to	make	a	
fair	presentation	of	the	risk88.
The duty to make a fair presentation of the risk: why there is no need for reform
1. Articles 1058 and 1059 of the Colombian Commercial Code
In	Colombia	the	assured’s	pre-contractual	information	duties	are	set	in	articles	1058	and	1059	of	the	
Commercial	Code.	Unlike	sections	18	and	20	of	the	Marine	Insurance	Act,	article	1058	does	not	clearly	
distinguish between non-disclosure and misrepresentation. In fact, what it does is establish that he who 
wishes to enter into a contract of insurance with an insurance company has a duty to “declare sincerely 
the	facts	and	circumstances	that	determine	the	state	of	the	risk	according	to	the	questionnaire	[form]	
proposed by the insurer” and it indicates that any “non-disclosure or misrepresentation of facts or 
circumstances,	that	if	known	by	the	insurer	they	would	have	withheld	him	from	subscribing	the	contract	
or would have led him to establish more onerous conditions, will allow him to avoid the contract”.
82 Judgement	of	11	April	2002,	per	Jorge	Santos	Ballesteros;	Judgement	of	2nd	August	2002,	per	Carlos	Ignacio	Jaramillo;	Judgement	of	
27	of	October	2005,	per	María	Elena	Giraldo;	Judgement	of	1st	of	September	2010,	per	Edgardo	Villamil	Portilla.
83 Judgement	C-232	of	15	Mayo	1997,	per	Jorge	Arango	Mejía.
84 Academics	are	of	the	same	opinion,	J	Efrén	Ossa	for	example	says	that	as	in	any	other	contract	good	faith	is	an	attribute	of	insurance,	
but that in insurance “it is in a higher degree, uberrimae fidei”. J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., p. 44.
85 Commercial Code, article 1060.
86 Ibíd, article 1076.
87 Ibíd,	article	1078.
88 It	is	said	that	the	general	rules	of	the	civil	code	are	insufficient	considering	the	special	characteristics	of	the	contract	of	insurance.	
See	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., pp.	326-327,	333-334.	However,	 it	 is	also	argued	 that	even	 though	 the	special	 regime	set	out	 for	 insurance	
contracts is more demanding than the one that applies to all other contracts, the general regime could eventually apply to insurance 
contracts	if	there	was	an	event	not	covered	by	the	special	rules.	See	A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., pp.	24-28.
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Further	on	paragraph	two	establishes	that	in	the	cases	in	which	“the	declaration	is	not	done	subject	to	
a determined questionnaire, any non-disclosure or misrepresentation produces the same consequence 
if	the	insured	has	negligently	concealed	facts	or	circumstances	that	involve	an	objective	aggravation	
of	the	risk”.
Fraudulent intent on behalf of the proposer is irrelevant and the contract will be voidable both in cases 
in which the proposer non-disclosed or misrepresented facts innocently or on purpose. Furthermore, 
article	1059	sets	that,	besides	being	able	to	avoid	the	contract,	the	insurer	can	also	retain	the	premium	
as a penalty. 
Nevertheless,	 a	 distinction	 must	 be	 made	 between	 negligent	 and	 diligent	 proposers:	 the	 rules,	 as	
detailed above, apply to negligent proposers (even if they are innocent), however if the non-disclosure 
or	misrepresentation	arises	from	blameless	error	of	the	proposer,	paragraph	three	of	article	1058	sets	
that the insurer will not be able to avoid the contract nor to retain the premium, but, if a loss occurs, the 
insurer may reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim89.
Finally,	paragraph	four	of	article	1058	clarifies	that	the	contract	will	not	be	voidable	nor	can	the	indemnity	
be	reduced	“if	the	insurer,	before	entering	into	the	contract,	knew	or	should	have	known	the	facts	and	
circumstances that were not disclosed or misrepresented, or, if after entering into the contract accepts 
to	correct	them	or	waives	them	either	expressly	or	implicitly”.
2. ‘Reticencia’	and	‘inexactitud’
The	Spanish	terms	used	by	the	code	that	we	have	translated	as	non-disclosure	and	misrepresentation	
are, respectively, reticencia and inexactitud.	Although	their	meaning	is	similar	to	what	is	understood	in	
English	insurance	law	by	non-disclosure	and	misrepresentation,	they	are	not	exact	equivalents.	Reticencia 
means to withhold or not say something, inexactitud	refers	to	giving	inaccurate	or	inexact	information.90 
Both	terms	describe	breaches	of	the	duty	to	faithfully	declare	the	state	of	the	risk	either	by	withholding	
or	giving	inaccurate	information,	but,	as	will	be	described	in	detail	below,	the	duty	is	subject	to	some	
limitations	not	present	in	English	law,	for	when	the	insurer	has	given	the	proposer	a	questionnaire,	they	
duty is substantially different from that of disclosure, since the information that the proposer cannot 
withhold	or	misstate	is	that	which	he	is	asked	about;	on	the	other	hand,	when	no	questionnaire	is	given,	
the	proposer	bears	a	real	duty	of	disclosure,	but	still	the	information	he	is	expected	to	give	is	less	than	
that	in	English	law.
The	 following	 sections	will	 develop	 in	detail	 the	different	 rules	 set	 in	articles	1058	and	1059	of	 the	
Commercial Code emphasising not only on differences they have if compared to the equivalent institutions 
in	English	law,	but	on	how	those	differences	entail,	in	most	of	the	cases,	a	more	favourable	regime	for	
the assured without annulling its original intent to protect the insurer. 
89	 The	 formula	 for	 the	 proportional	 reduction	 is	 identical	 to	 the	 one	 established	 in	 the	 Consumer	 Insurance	 (Disclosure	 and	
Representations)	Act	2012.
90	 A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., pp. 20-21.
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3. Questionnaire, or no questionnaire, that is the question
Even	though	legally,	as	set	by	article	1058,	the	presentation	of	the	risk	can	be	subjected	or	not	to	a 
questionnaire, Colombian practice is inclined towards the use of a questionnaire91.	 Professor	Ossa,	
architect of modern Colombian insurance law92, considered this practice to be more technical and 
legitimate	because	proponents	of	insurance	have	no	reason	to	know	all	the	factors	(either	objective	or	
subjective)	that	determine	the	state	of	the	risk,	while	the	insurer,	because	of	his	profession,	has	to	be	
aware of them and consequently he must direct the proposer’s presentation through a questionnaire 
which ought to be answered with the highest intellectual and moral scruples93.
The	insurer’s	decision	to	offer	or	not	a	questionnaire	to	the	proposer	is	highly	relevant	for	two	significant	
reasons: on the one hand it determines the scope of facts and circumstances that must be declared 
by the proposer, ie the facts and circumstances that must be informed vary depending on if he has 
been	given	a	questionnaire	or	not.	For	example,	when	the	declaration	is	subject	to	a	questionnaire,	the	
insurer may inquire on both physical and moral hazard94;	whereas	 if	 the	declaration	 is	not	subjected	
to	a	questionnaire,	 the	assured’s	 information	duty	 is	 limited	to	physical	hazard	because	article	1058	
establishes that in this case the insurer can only avoid the policy if the non-disclosed or misrepresented 
fact	implies	and	‘objective’	aggravation	of	the	risk95. Further on, when a questionnaire is proposed by 
the	insurer	anything	that	is	not	investigated	or	asked	in	the	insurer’s	form	does	not	have	to	be	disclosed	
by	the	assured	because	article	1058	clearly	set	that	the	declaration	must	be	made	“according	to	the	
questionnaire proposed by the insurer”96.	This	may	sound	harsh	on	insurers	and	might	at	first	glance	
tempt them to not advance a questionnaire, yet, the assured’s duty of disclosure when he is not presented 
with a form may be even more limited as it is reduced to the “circumstances that, according to common 
sense,	 imply	an	aggravation	of	 the	 risk,	 [because,	since]	he	 is	not	a	specialist	 in	 insurance,	his	duty	
cannot	reach	the	extreme	subtleness	that	could	barely	be	noticed	by	the	keen	judgement	of	an	insurer”97. 
The	second	reason	why	the	insurer’s	decision	to	offer	or	not	a	questionnaire	to	the	proposer	is	highly	
relevant, regards the onus of proof: when there is no questionnaire the insurer must prove that the 
proposer’s non-disclosure or misrepresentation was negligent, while when there was a questionnaire it 
is	the	proposer	who	must	prove	that,	despite	his	mistake,	he	acted	diligently98.
91	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit.,	pp.	325,	329;	A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., p. 33.
92	 C.	Jaramillo,	Op. cit., 11-12.
93	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., pp. 325-326.
94	 Corte	Suprema	de	Justicia,	Judgement	of	12	September	2002,	per	Carlos	Ignacio	Jaramillo;	Corte	Suprema	de	Justicia,	Judgement	of	
11	April	2002,	per	Jorge	Santos	Ballesteros.
95	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., p.	329.
96 Ibíd.,	p.	329;	A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., p. 33.
97	 ‘Explanatory	Preamble	to	the	1958	Code	of	Commerce	Project’	in	Ossa	(n	1)	Appendix	III	(free	translation);	see	also	J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., pp. 
330-332.
98	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit.,	pp.	337-339;	However,	professor	Ordóñez,	even	though	he	accepts	that	when	there	is	no	questionnaire	the	insurer	
must	prove	that	the	proposer	was	negligent,	while	when	there	was	a	questionnaire	it	is	the	proposer	who	must	prove	his	mistake	was	
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Thus	 it	 is	 highly	 recommendable	 for	 the	 insurer	 to	 opt	 for	 elaborating	 questionnaires	 in	 the	 pre-
contractual	stage.	The	advantages	of	doing	so	were	increased	even	further	when	the	Supreme	Court	in	
the	Judgement	of	1st September 201099 established that, in order to prove the relevance that a certain 
fact	or	circumstance	had	for	the	insurer,	it	was	enough	to	check	if	he	had	asked	about	those	facts	or	
circumstances in the questionnaire, thereby creating a legal presumption that all facts and circumstances 
asked	by	 the	 insurer	were	 relevant.	 The	Court	 clearly	 stated	 that	 “the	 insurance	professional	 [ie	 the	
insurer]	does	not	ask	for	irrelevant	data,	nor	has	the	burden	of	proving	that	they	were	[relevant]”.
The	 duality	 between	 declarations	 subject	 to	 a	 questionnaire	 and	 those	 that	 are	 not,	 with	 all	 the	
implications that are derived from opting between one alternative and the other, is perhaps one of the 
biggest	differences	between	the	assured’s	pre-contractual	information	duties	in	Colombian	and	English	
law	(especially	compared	to	the	pre-Consumer	Insurance	Act	regime).	The	fact	that	the	duty	to	inform	is	
subjected	to	that	which	is	asked	in	the	form	levels	the	playing	ground	between	the	contracting	parties	
in	the	way	submitted	by	Hasson100, for it gives the assured, who has the duty to inform, an idea of the 
information	that	he	is	expected	to	give	to	the	insurer	and	which	he	on	his	own	might	never	imagine	to	be	
relevant.	The	duty	is	also	much	more	narrow	when	no	form	is	provided,	for	the	assured	is	not	expected	
to disclose all facts and circumstances which might be considered relevant from an insurer’s point of 
view	but	 just	 those	that	according	 to	common	sense	(as	opposed	to	professional	expertise)	 imply	an	
aggravation	of	the	risk	and,	in	the	event	that	he	does	not	comply,	it	will	be	for	the	insurer	to	prove	that	
his breach was a negligent one that will allow the insurer to avoid the contract. Such differences by their 
own	might	be	enough	to	justify	why	there	has	been	no	need	for	reform	in	Colombia,	since	the	scope	of	
the	assured’s	duty	under	the	Colombian	framework	is	reduced	to	a	feasible	standard	from	the	assured’s	
point of view.
4. Relevance, materiality or inducement?
The	subcommittee	in	charge	of	drafting	the	insurance	chapter	of	the	Commercial	Code	debated	around	
if they should establish, in order for the insurer to be allowed to avoid the contract, that the facts or 
circumstances	undisclosed	or	misrepresented	had	to	be	such	that	if	known	by	the	insurer	they	would	
lead	him	to	establish	different	contractual	conditions	or	to	reject	the	contract	altogether:	on	one	side	
Dr. Cobo considered that this would place the harsh burden of proving such a fact on the insurance 
company,	which	would	in	turn	make	impractical	the	protection	intended	by	the	duty;	on	the	other	side	
Professor	Ossa	considered	that	not	doing	so	would	be	contradictory	with	the	general	regime	of	contract	
law	in	which	rescission	for	mistake,	duress	and	fraud	all	required	that	the	unknown	fact	or	circumstance	
be determinant for the parties decision to enter into the contract, besides he considered that the onus 
of proof was not a harsh one to bare101.
diligent	and	blameless,	points	out	that	the	code’s	wording	on	this	point	is	obscure	and	not	technically	accurate.	A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones 
de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., pp. 33-35.
99	 Per	Edgardo	Villamil	Portilla.
100	 R.	Hasson,	‘The	Doctrine	of	Uberrimae	Fides	in	Insurance	Law’,	Op. cit., pp. 633-634.
101	 Acoldese,	Actas del Subcomité de Seguros del Comité Asesor para la Revisión del Código de Comercio: Antecedentes del Título V del 
Libro Cuarto del Código de Comercio sobre el Contrato de Seguro	(Acoldese)	92-99.
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As	evidenced	by	the	text	of	article	1058,	it	was	this second position that triumphed and in order for the 
insurer to be able to avoid the contract or to reduce the indemnity the undisclosed or misrepresented 
fact	must	be	one	that,	if	known	by	the	insurer,	it	would	have	withheld	him	from	entering	into	the	contract	
or	would	at	least	led	him	to	propose	more	onerous	conditions.	The	facts	and	circumstances	that	fulfil	this	
condition	are	referred	to	by	the	academics	as	‘relevant’	facts102.
The	requirement	of	relevance	seems	to	be	more	similar	to	the	English	requirement	of	inducement	than	
to	that	of	materiality	in	the	sense	that	it	is	subjective	and	not	objective:	it	is	the	insurer	at	hand	that	must	
prove that he would not have entered into the contract or would have done so in different terms had he 
known	the	undisclosed	or	misrepresented	fact103;	it	has	not	been	considered	by	the	academics	or	the	
courts	that	the	standard	of	‘relevance’	should	be	set	according	to	an	objective	criteria	such	as	that	of	
‘the	prudent	underwriter’.	However,	the	proof	of	relevance	has	been	made	easier,	as	indicated	above,	by	
the	‘presumption	of	relevance’	created	by	the	Court	regarding	the	questions	laid	down	by	the	insurer	in	
the proposal form.
Nonetheless	it	must	be	restated	that,	even	though	relevance	is	determined	in	the	described	way,	unlike	
English	 law	 regarding	 materiality	 or	 inducement,	 in	 Colombia	 the	 assured	 does	 not	 have	 a	 duty	 to	
disclose	all	relevant	facts	and	circumstances	known	to	him,	but	just	those	for	which	he	is	asked	for	in	
the	form	or,	if	no	questionnaire	is	advanced	to	him	by	the	insurer,	just	those	facts	or	circumstances	that,	
according	to	common	sense,	imply	an	objective	aggravation	of	the	risk.	This	reduced	scope	of	the	facts	
and circumstances that have to be informed diminishes the effective harshness that may be derived 
from	the	fact	that	the	test	for	‘relevance’	depends	on	what	the	insurer	considers	material	and	constitutes	
itself	as	the	second	significant	difference	between	Colombian	and	English	law	on	the	matter	that	has	led	
the former to not consider the need of modifying the law.
Finally,	still	on	the	issue	of	materiality	or	relevance,	again	unlike	English	general	insurance	law,	but	in	
the	same	 fashion	of	 the	Consumer	 Insurance	Act,	materiality	 cannot	be	made	 irrelevant	by	way	of	a	
warranty	that	makes	the	declaration	into	the	basis	of	the	contract,	because,	even	though	article	1061	
of	 the	 Colombian	 Commercial	 Code	 defines	warranties	 in	 identical	 terms	 as	 section	 33	 of	 the	MIA,	
article	1.2.1.3.(b)	(Ch	II,	T	VI)	of	the	Circular	Básica	Jurídica	007	of	1996	issued	by	the	Superintendencia	
Financiera	de	Colombia	(ie	the	Colombian	equivalent	to	the	Financial	Service	Authority)	establishes	the	
non-disclosure	and	misrepresentation,	as	set	in	article	1058	of	the	Commercial	Code,	cannot	have	any	
other legal consequences apart from those established in the Code.
5. Remedies
As	set	by	articles	1058	and	1059	of	the	Commercial	Code,	three	are	the	remedies	available	to	the	insurer	
when	the	assured	has	breached	his	duty	to	faithfully	declare	the	state	of	the	risk:	avoidance,	retention	of	
the	premium	and	the	reduction	of	the	indemnity.	The	first	two	are	available	when	the	proposer’s	relevant	
non-disclosure	or	misrepresentation	was	fraudulent	or	negligent	(even	if	innocent);	the	third	remedy	is	
102	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., pp. 330-331.
103	 Corte	Suprema	de	Justicia,	Judgement	of	12	September	2002,	per	Carlos	Ignacio	Jaramillo.
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available as a substitute for the other two when the proposer incurred in a relevant non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation innocently and without negligence.
The	first	remedy,	avoidance,	as	in	England,	means	avoidance	ab	initio,	therefore	it	is	irrelevant	if	there	is	no	
relationship between the issues that were not disclosed and the claimed event104.	This	matter	is	actually	
one	of	the	few	on	which	there	has	been	some	debate	around	‘reform’	since	it	reached	the	Constitutional	
Court when a plaintiff submitted that the fact that the insurer could avoid the contract even in cases 
in which there was no connection between the non-disclosed or misrepresented circumstance and the 
claimed	event	went	against	 the	Constitutional	 rights	of	 fairness,	equality	and	 justice	because	 it	was	
disproportionate	and	nothing	justified	a	separate	regime	for	contracts	of	insurance.	The	Court	discharged	
the submission by concluding, after a careful and important analysis of good faith in insurance law and 
the	assured’s	pre-contractual	information	duties,	that	the	“reason	for	the	[special]	rescissory	regime	in	
insurance contracts is based on the very nature of the insurance business, which requires the presence 
of	a	qualified	good	faith	or	uberrimae	bona	fidei”105	and	therefore	is	justified	and	in	accordance	with	the	
Constitution.
The	second	remedy,	retention	of	the	premium,	is	actually	one	aspect	in	which	Colombian	law	is	harsher	
than	English	law	(both	before	and	after	the	introduction	of	the	Consumer	Insurance	Act)	for	it	allows	the	
insurance company to retain the premium both in cases in which there was fraudulent intent on behalf of 
the	proposer	as	in	cases	in	which	his	non-disclosure	or	misrepresentation	was	negligent.	Nevertheless	
this issue by itself has not been enough to motivate reform.
The	 last	 remedy	 is	 the	 third	 substantial	 difference	 between	 Colombian	 and	 English	 law	 (at	 least	 in	
regards	to	business	insurance	in	England)	that	has	prevented	the	need	for	reform.	Similar	to	section	7	
of	schedule	1	of	the	Consumer	Insurance	Act,	paragraph	3	of	article	1058	established	that	the	insurer	
would not be able to avoid the contract if the assured’s non-disclosure or misrepresentation was due 
to	a	blameless	mistake,	in	which	case	the	insurer	would	only	be	allowed	to	reduce	the	indemnity.	This	
solution	has	been	regarded	as	a	prudent	balance	between	the	need	to	protect	the	technical	background	
of insurance and the wish to promote fairness in the contract106 and therefore reduces criticism that 
might	arise	because	of	the	existence	of	a	univocal	and	severe	remedy	(as	those	that	existed	in	England).
Unlike	 section	6	of	Schedule	1	of	 the	Consumer	 Insurance	Act,	Colombian	 law	does	not	 establish	a	
fourth	 remedy	consistent	on	 treating	 the	contract	on	different	 terms	 if	 the	 insurer,	had	he	known	of	
the non-disclosed or misrepresented fact, would have only entered the contract if those terms had 
been established. Such a remedy was not thought of but could be an interesting addition if reform of 
Colombian law was eventually sought.
104	 A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., pp.	46-47;	Andrés	E	Ordóñez,	‘El	Tratamiento	Civil	de	la	Mala	Fe	del	Asegurado	
en	el	Contrato	de	Seguro’	(2005)	E-Mercatoria,	Vol.	4,	No.	2,	8-10;	C.	Jaramillo,	Op. cit.,	pp.	671-686.
105	 Corte	Constitucional,	Judgement	C-232	of	15	Mayo	1997,	per	Jorge	Arango	Mejía.
106	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., pp. 340-341.
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It	must	be	noted	that	nowhere	in	article	1058	is	the	proposer’s	duty	conditioned	to	his	knowledge	of	
the	facts	and	circumstances	that	are	being	declared.	The	academics	are	divided	on	the	issue:	on	the	
one	hand,	Professor	Ossa	considered	that	the	proposer’s	duty	to	sincerely	declare	the	state	of	the	risk	
is	limited	to	the	facts	or	circumstances	that	he	knows	or	ought	to	know	when	the	contract	is	entered	
into107.	This	position	would	set	Colombian	law	in	a	similar	state	to	that	of	England108.	However,	professor	
Ordóñez	 believes	 otherwise:	 he	 considers	 that	 the	 assured’s	 knowledge	 is	 not	 a	 requisite	 and	 that	
therefore any non-disclosure or misrepresentation will allow the insurer to avoid the contract irrespective 
of	the	proposer’s	knowledge,	except	if	his	ignorance	can	be	proved	to	be	a	type	of	blameless	error	of	
the proposer, in which case the insurer will only be allowed to reduce the indemnity109. If this is the case, 
Colombian	law	might	be	more	demanding	on	this	issue	than	English	law,	both	as	established	in	the	MIA	
and	the	Consumer	Insurance	Act.
6. Further development of the duty by the Supreme Court
One	of	the	most	important	cases	regarding	article	1058	of	the	Commercial	Code	was	decided	by	the	
Colombian	Supreme	Court	 of	 Justice	 in	 Judgement	of	2nd	 August	2002,	per	Carlos	 Ignacio	 Jaramillo.	
Reference	to	this	paradigmatic	case	is	important	because	it	evidences	the	different	approach	held	by	
the	Colombian	and	English	Courts	on	a	similar	issue,	being	the	approach	of	the	former	more	pro-assured	
than the approach of the latter.
The	 facts	of	 the	case	were	 the	 following:	 the	 insured,	 Jaime	Forero	Malo,	approached	 the	defendant	
insurance	company	interested	in	insuring	his	life.	He	was	provided	with	an	application	form	that	contained,	
among	other	things,	in	accordance	to	article	1058,	a	questionnaire	designed	to	inform	the	insurer	about	
the	state	of	the	risk	and,	based	on	his	answers,	he	was	ordered	some	general	medical	exams.	The	doctor	
that	performed	the	exams	indicated	the	existence	of	some	anomalies,	suggested	an	additional	exam	
and	considered	the	risk	as	unacceptable.	Nevertheless,	 the	 insurance	company,	with	the	 information	
provided	in	the	questionnaire	and	the	exams	made	by	its	own	doctor,	but	without	ordering	the	additional	
exams	that	had	been	suggested,	accepted	to	insure	Mr.	Forero	for	an	additional	premium.	Mr.	Forero,	
after having answered the questionnaire, but before the insurer accepted to insure him, discovered 
through another doctor that he had bladder cancer but did not inform the insurance company of his 
discovery.	The	assured	died	a	couple	of	months	after	being	insured,	so	consequently	the	beneficiaries	
presented	a	claim	to	the	insurance	company,	which	in	turn	objected	the	claim	arguing	that	the	policy	
was void because Mr. Forero had breached the principle of good faith by failing to disclose that he had 
bladder	cancer	before	the	contract	was	entered	into	and	that,	if	they	had	known	of	that	circumstances,	
they would not have agreed to insure him at all.
107	 J.	Ossa,	Op. cit., pp. 330, 337.
108	 It	is	accepted	in	English	law	that	“you	cannot	disclose	what	you	do	not	know”.	See	Joel	v	Law	Union	and	Crwon	Insurance	(1908)	99	LT	
712;	Economides	v	Commercial	Union	Insurance	plc	[1997]	3	All	ER	636.	
109	 A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., pp.	37-38.
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As	explained	by	professor	Ordóñez110, two issues had to be solved by the court: a) is there a breach of 
the	duty	to	sincerely	declare	the	state	of	the	risk	if	the	assured	does	not	declare	facts	or	circumstances	
that,	if	known	by	the	insurer	would	have	led	him	to	not	accept	the	risk,	if	these	facts	or	circumstances	
came	to	the	assured’s	knowledge	after	he	had	answered	the	questionnaire	but	before	the	insurance	
company	had	accepted	the	risk?;	b)	can	the	assured’s	breach	of	the	duty	to	sincerely	declare	the	state	
of	the	risk	be	excused	when	the	insurer	does	not	know	of	the	non-disclosed	information	because	of	his	
own	negligence?
Regarding	 the	 first	 issue	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 considered	 that,	 since	 good	 faith	 “is	 not	 a	 principle	
of	 ephemeral	 and	 irrelevant	 figuration	 within	 the	 scene	 of	 law”,	 for	 it	 is	 present	 in	 full	 and	 with	
marked	 intention	along	all	 the	stages	of	contract	 formation,	development	and	execution,	 in	order	 to	
“evaluate	whether	a	given	person	acted	or	not	 in	good	 faith,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	examine,	 in	each	of	
the aforementioned phases, the behaviour displayed by him”. Consequently if the proposer answers 
sincerely the questionnaire set by the insurer but later on discovers that his answers contradict what 
he	now	 knows	 and	does	 not	 inform	 the	 insurer	 about	 this	 fact	 before	 the	 insurer	 accepts	 the	 risk,	
then	it	cannot	be	said	that	his	behaviour	was	in	accordance	to	good	faith.	“Hence	the	relevant	facts	
or	circumstances	supervening	 to	 the	declaration	of	 the	state	of	 the	 risk	 […]	must	be	communicated	
without	delay.”	In	this	aspect	Colombian	and	English	law	are	alike111.
However,	considering	the	second	issue,	the	Court	established	that	this	was	a	clear	example	of	how,	in	
accordance	with	the	provisions	of	article	1058	of	the	Commercial	Code,	if	the	insurer	knew	or,	as	it	was	
in	this	case,	should	have	known	of	the	undisclosed	or	misrepresented	fact,	he	would	not	be	allowed	to	
avoid	the	contract.	The	judge	considered	that	since	the	insurer’s	medical	doctor	suggested	an	additional	
exam,	that	would	have	revealed	the	grave	health	condition	of	the	assured,	and	the	company	refused	to	
order	such	an	exam,	then	the	insurance	company	was	taking	on	itself	the	risk	in	whatever	condition	it	
may be, therefore it could not pretend to avoid the contract for a non-disclosed fact that it should have 
known	if	it	had	been	diligent.	It	must	be	clarified	that	there	is	no	duty	in	Colombian	law	for	the	insurer	to	
inspect	the	risk,112	but	once	the	insurance	company	had	already	decided	to	inspect	the	risk	by	ordering	
some	medical	exams	and	these	resulted	in	the	company’s	medical	doctor	advising	to	perform	some	
additional ones, then common business sense did oblige the company to either perform such additional 
exams	or	to	assume	the	consequences	of	not	having	done	so.
Even	though	the	facts	of	this	case	are	substantially	different	from	those	of	Bates	v	Hewitt113 commented 
above,	 the	 judge’s	 decision	 to	maintain	 the	 contract	 in	 force	 despite	 the	 assured’s	 fraudulent	 non-
disclosure, ie notwithstanding the assured’s clear breach of the principle of good faith (it was proven 
110	 Andrés	E	Ordoñez,	‘Inexactitud	y	Reticencia	en	la	Declaración	del	Estado	del	Riesgo	a	Través	de	Dos	Sentencias	de	la	Corte	Suprema	
de	Justicia	Colombiana’	(2003)	E-Mercatoria,	Vol.	2,	Num	1,	2-3.
111	 Looker	v	Law	Union	and	Rock	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1928]	1	KB	554.
112	 Corte	Constitucional,	Judgement	C-232	of	15	Mayo	1997,	per	Jorge	Arango	Mejía.
113	 (1867)	LR	2	QB	595.
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in the process that Mr. Forero had deliberately withheld the information from the insurer), evidences a 
more	pro-assured	approach	even	when	dealing	with	an	institution	that	has	the	objective	to	protect	the	
insurer from fraud. 
It	 cannot	 go	 without	 saying	 that	 this	 last	 point	 has	 been	 severely	 criticized	 by	 professor	 Ordóñez,
who considers that when it is proven that the assured’s non-disclosure or misrepresentation was 
intentional,	 the	 insurer	 should	 be	 able	 to	 avoid	 the	 contract	 even	 if	 he	 would	 have	 known	 of	 the	
undisclosed fact had it not been for his carelessness in the contracting stage114.
7. Final remarks on the duty to make a fair presentation of the risk
It	cannot	be	forgotten	that	the	regime	that	has	been	explained	above	was	only	introduced	by	the	1971	
Commercial	Code.	If	we	take	a	second	look	at	the	law	on	the	matter	in	the	previous	code,	we	can	evidence	
that	the	changes	introduced	were	far-reaching.	The	old	law	was	too	simple	for	such	an	important	matter	
and	if	it	had	not	been	changed	with	the	rest	of	Colombian	commercial	institutions	in	1971,	it	is	likely	that	
a great amount of criticism would have risen in these last 40 years.
The	regime	introduced	by	articles	1058	and	1059	is	not	perfect.	Although	it	is	in	general	terms	a	pretty	
fair balanced regulation, that offers a great deal of protection for assureds (especially if it is remembered 
that its principal purpose is to protect insurers), it also has its disadvantages and hardships: the right 
the	insurer	has	to	retain	the	premium	every	time	he	can	avoid	the	contract	is	excessive	and	unfair	to	
non-fraudulent	assureds	who	just	happened	to	not	be	diligent	enough	in	the	declaration	of	the	risk;	the	
fact	that	the	proposer’s	knowledge	is	not	taken	into	account	to	determine	what	must	be	declared,	is	also	
unjust.	Nevertheless,	all	things	considered,	these	few	drawbacks	do	not	amount	to	a	need	for	reform.
It must also be borne in mind that the abundance of good faith in Colombian contract law in general, 
makes	it	easier	for	Colombian	lawyers	to	accept	the	existence,	influence	and	consequences	of	good	faith	
in	insurance	law.	Even	if	good	faith	is	present	with	unique	intensity	and	imposing	stricter	burdens	than	
in other contracts, the special rules that apply to insurance are not at all that different from those that 
apply to other businesses and therefore are easily received by the legal community.
All	this	put	together	leads	to	the	fact	that,	after	the	significant	changes	introduced	in	1971,	no	further	
modification	to	the	assured’s	pre-contractual	information duties has been deemed necessary.
114	 A.	Ordóñez,	Lecciones de Derecho de Seguros, Op. cit., pp.	40-45;	A.	Ordóñez	‘Inexactitud	y	Reticencia	en	la	Declaración	del	Estado	
del	Riesgo’,	Op. cit., 14-16.
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Conclusion
As	seen	throughout	this	paper,	both	Colombian	and	English	law	impose	pre-contractual	information	
duties	 on	 the	 assured;	 in	 both	 cases	 these	 duties	 are	 derived	 from	 the	 principle	 of	 good	 faith	
present	 in	 Roman	 law,	 the	 law	 merchant	 and	 throughout	 early	 modern	 insurance	 law.	 However,	
the	development	of	 this	principle	and	the	consequent	duties	 in	each	 jurisdiction	 led	to	sufficiently	
significant	differences	that	produced	substantial	criticism	and	reform	in	England,	but	have	not	led	to	
much criticism in Colombia.
It	 cannot	 be	affirmed	 that	 the	Colombian	approach	 is	 always	more	 favourable	 to	 the	assured;	 for	
example,	 in	 regards	 to	 retention	 of	 the	 premium	 and	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 assured’s	 knowledge,	
English	law	is	less	harsh.	In	several	circumstances	both	jurisdictions	have	reached	similar	solutions	
as in the fact that the duty is in place until the contract is entered into, the requirement of inducement 
or relevance and in avoidance (ab initio)	 being	 the	 principal	 remedy.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 specific	
situations in which Colombian law is more assured friendly have been enough to not disturb the 
different	actors	of	the	insurance	business.	Yet,	the	differences	between	English	and	Colombian	law,	
mainly the different scope of the information that has to be disclosed or represented, the availability 
of remedies depending of the circumstances surrounding the non-disclosed or misrepresented 
circumstances, and the pro-assured or pro-insurer approach held by the courts, do manifest a more 
protectionist regime for the assured in the Colombian setting that is more consistent with the original 
objectives	of	the	principle	of	good	faith.
The	 solutions	 introduced	 in	2012	 in	England	have	 in	a	 great	way	equated,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 field	of	
consumer insurance law, the assured’s pre-contractual duty of information with the Colombian regime. 
The	new	consumer	 insurance	rules	 in	England,	by	eliminating	 the	duty	of	disclosure,	 removing	 the	
requirement of materiality leaving only the requirement of inducement, and not allowing the assured’s 
representations to be made into the basis of the contract, have levelled the playing ground between 
insurers	and	assureds	in	a	similar	way	to	the	Colombian	Commercial	Code	of	1971.	Regarding	the	
remedies	the	Consumer	Insurance	Act	2012	established,	it	can	even	be	said	that	it	went	beyond	the	
advantages	that	Colombian	law	has	on	this	matter.	Nevertheless,	although	this	could	be	erected	as	a	
model	to	update	Colombian	law,	the	current	state	in	which	it	is,	is	sufficiently	satisfactory.
In	the	end	both	jurisdictions	have	been	able	to	cope	with	the	difficulties	that	good	faith	in	the	pre-
contractual stage can entail. Most problems have been or are being addressed and good faith and 
the	assured’s	pre-contractual	information	duties	remain	a	very	significant	and	important	part	of	both	
countries insurance contract law.
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